We estimate the rebound effect for motor vehicles, by which improved fuel efficiency causes additional travel, using a pooled cross section of US states for 1966-2001. Our model accounts for endogenous changes in fuel efficiency, distinguishes between autocorrelation and lagged effects, includes a measure of the stringency of fuel-economy standards, and allows the rebound effect to vary with income, urbanization, and the fuel cost of driving. At sample averages of variables, our simultaneous-equations estimates of the short-and long-run rebound effect are 4.5% and 22.2%. But rising real income caused it to diminish substantially over the period, perhaps aided by falling fuel prices. With variables at 1997-2001 levels, our estimates are only 2.2% and 10.7%, considerably smaller than values typically assumed for policy analysis. The point estimates suggest that the rebound effect would remain constant if real incomes continue to grow and fuel prices were to grow about 3.5 times as fast. JEL-codes: Q0, D5, R4, C2 Keywords:
Introduction
It has long been realized that improving energy efficiency releases an economic reaction that partially offsets the original energy saving. As the energy efficiency of some process improves, the process becomes cheaper, thereby providing an incentive to increase its use. Thus total energy consumption changes less than proportionally to changes in physical energy efficiency. This "rebound effect" is typically quantified as the extent of the deviation from proportionality. It has been studied in many contexts, including residential space heating and cooling, appliances, and transportation (Greening, Greene, and Difiglio, 2000) .
For motor vehicles, the energy input is fuel and the associated service is travel, typically measured as vehicle-miles traveled (VMT). When vehicles are made more fuel-efficient, it costs less to drive a mile, so VMT increases if demand for it is downward-sloping. That in turn causes more fuel to be used than would be the case if VMT were constant; the difference is the rebound effect. Obtaining reliable measures of it is important because it helps determine the effectiveness of measures intended to reduce fuel consumption and because increased driving exacerbates congestion and air pollution. For example, the rebound effect was an issue in the evaluation of recently adopted greenhouse-gas regulations for California (CARB, 2004, Sect. 12.3-12.4) . It has played a prominent role in analyses of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) regulations in the US and of proposals to strengthen them. The rebound effect is also relevant to the problem of instrument choice: if it is large, then price instruments become relatively more effective compared to technology standards because higher energy prices counteract the rebound effect.
This paper presents estimates of the rebound effect for passenger-vehicle use that are based on pooled cross-sectional time-series data at the U.S. State level. It adds to a sizeable econometric literature, contributing four main improvements. First, we use a longer time series than was possible in earlier studies. This increases the precision of our estimates, enabling us (among other things) to determine short-and long-run rebound effects and their dependence on income. Second, the econometric specifications rest on an explicit model of simultaneous aggregate demand for VMT, vehicle stock, and fuel efficiency. The model is estimated directly using two-and three-stage least squares (2SLS and 3SLS); thus we can treat consistently the fact that the rebound effect is defined starting with a given change in fuel
efficiency, yet fuel efficiency itself is endogenous. Third, we measure the stringency of CAFE regulation, which was in effect during part of our sample period, in a theoretically motivated way: as the gap between the standard and drivers' desired aggregate fuel efficiency, the latter estimated using pre-CAFE data and a specification consistent with our behavioral model. Fourth, we allow the rebound effect to depend on income and on the fuel cost of driving. The dependence on income is expected from theory (Greene, 1992) , and is suggested by micro-based estimates across deciles of the income distribution (West, 2004) . Just like income changes, changes in fuel prices affect the share of fuel costs in the total cost of driving, and so we also expect them to influence the rebound effect.
Our best estimates of the rebound effect for the US as a whole, over the period , are 4.5% for the short run and 22.2% for the long run. The 2SLS and 3SLS results are mostly similar to each other but differ from ordinary least squares (OLS) results, which are unsatisfactory as they strongly depend on details of the specification. While our short-run estimate is at the lower end of results found in the literature, the long-run estimate is similar to what is found in most earlier work. Additional estimation results, like the long-run priceelasticity of fuel demand (-0.43 ) and the proportion of it that is caused by mileage changes (52%), are similar to those in the literature.
This agreement is qualified, however, by our finding that the magnitude of the rebound effect depends negatively on income and, with less certainty, positively on the fuel cost of driving. These dependences substantially reduce the magnitude that applies to recent years . For example, using average values of income, urbanization and fuel costs measured over the most recent five-year period covered in our data set (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) , our results imply short-and long-run rebound effects of just 2.2% and 10.7%, roughly half the average values over the longer time period. Similarly, the long-run price elasticity of fuel demand declines in magnitude in recent years and so does the proportion of it caused by changes in amount of motor-vehicle travel.
These changes are largely the result of real income growth and lower real fuel prices. Future values of the rebound effect depend on how those factors evolve.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the definition of the rebound effect and reviews some key contributions toward measuring it. Section 3 presents our theoretical model and the econometric specification, and section 4 presents estimation results.
Section 5 concludes.
Background
The rebound effect for motor vehicles is typically defined in terms of an exogenous change in fuel efficiency, E. Fuel consumption F and motor-vehicle travel M -the latter measured here as VMT per year -are related through the identity F=M/E. The rebound effect arises because travel M depends (among other things) on the variable cost per mile of driving, a part of which is the per-mile fuel cost, P M ≡P F /E, where P F is the price of fuel. This dependence can be measured by the elasticity of M with respect to P M , which we denote ε M,PM . When E is viewed as exogenous, it is easy to show that fuel usage responds to it according to the elasticity 
, where ε E,PF measures the effect of fuel price on efficiency. Thus the observed difference between ε F,PF and ε M,PF requires that ε E,PF be considerably different from zero. Ignoring this dependence of E on P F , as is done in many studies, may cause the rebound effect to be overestimated if unobserved factors that cause M to be large (e.g. an unusually long commute) also cause E to be large (e.g. the commuter chooses fuel-efficient vehicles to reduce the cost of that commute).
A second limitation of the standard definition is that fuel cost is just one of several components of the total cost of using motor vehicles. Another important component is time cost, which is likely to increase as incomes grow. If consumers' response to fuel costs is related to the proportion of total cost accounted for by fuel, then |ε M,PM | should increase with fuel cost itself and diminish with income (Greene, 1992) . Our specification allows for such dependences.
Furthermore, time costs increase with traffic congestion; we account for this indirectly by allowing the rebound effect to depend on urbanization, although empirically this turns out to be unimportant. An extension, not attempted here, would be to allow congestion to be endogenous within the system that determines amount of travel.
Some empirical studies of the rebound effect have used aggregate time-series data. Greene (1992) uses annual U.S. data for 1957-1989 to estimate the rebound effect at 5 to 15% both in the short and long run, with a best estimate of 12.7%. According to Greene, failing to account for autocorrelation -which he estimates at 0.74 -results in spurious measurements of lagged values and to the erroneous conclusion that long-run effects are larger than short-run effects. 3 Greene also presents evidence that the fuel-cost-per-mile elasticity declines over time, consistent with the effect of income just discussed; but the evidence has only marginal statistical significance.
Jones (1993) re-examines Greene's data, adding observations for 1990 and focusing on model-selection issues in time-series analysis. He finds that although Greene's autoregressive model is statistically valid, so are alternative specifications, notably those including lagged dependent variables. The latter produce long-run estimates of the rebound effect that substantially exceed the short-run estimates (roughly 31% vs. 11%). 4 Schimek (1996) uses data from a still longer time period and finds an even smaller short-run but a similarly large long-run rebound effect (29%). 5 Schimek accounts for federal CAFE regulations by including a time trend for years since 1978; he also includes dummy variables for the years 1974 and 1979, when gasoline rationing was in effect. These controls reduce the extent of autocorrelation in the residuals.
These aggregate studies highlight the possible importance of lagged dependent variables (inertia) for sorting out short-run and long-run effects. But they do not settle the issue because they have trouble disentangling the presence of a lagged dependent variable from the presence of autocorrelation. Their estimates of these dynamic properties are especially sensitive to the time period considered and to their treatment of the CAFE regulations.
Another type of study relies on pooled cross-sectional time-series data at a smaller geographical level of aggregation. Haughton and Sarkar (1996) construct such a data set for the 50 U.S. States and the District of Columbia, from 1970 to 1991. Fuel prices vary by state, primarily but not exclusively because of different rates of fuel tax, providing an additional opportunity to observe the effects of fuel price on travel. The authors estimate equations both for VMT per driver and for fuel intensity (the inverse of fuel efficiency), obtaining a rebound effect of about 16% in the short run and 22% in the long run. 6 Here, autocorrelation and the effects of a lagged dependent variable are measured with sufficient precision to distinguish them; they obtain a statistically significant coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, implying a substantial difference between long and short run. Tackling yet another dynamic issue, Haughton and Sarkar find that fuel efficiency is unaffected by the current price of gasoline unless that price exceeds its historical peak -a kind of hysteresis. In that equation, CAFE is taken into account through a variable measuring the difference between the legal minimum in a given year and the actual fuel efficiency in 1975. However, that variable is so strongly correlated with the historical maximum real price of gasoline that they omit it in most specifications, casting doubt on whether the resulting estimates, especially of hysteresis, really control adequately for the CAFE regulation.
It appears that the confounding of dynamics with effects of the CAFE regulation is a limiting factor in many studies. There is no agreement on how to control for CAFE, and results seem sensitive to the choice. This is partly because the standards were imposed at about the same time that a major increase in fuel prices occurred. But it is also because the control variables used are not constructed from an explicit theory of how CAFE worked. We attempt to remedy this in our empirical work. In summary, prior literature shows that aggregate estimates of the rebound effect, especially of the long-run effect, are sensitive to specification -in particular to the treatment of time patterns and CAFE standards. Disaggregate studies tend to produce a greater range of estimates; but those that exploit both cross-sectional and temporal variation find a long-run rebound effect in the neighborhood of 20-23%, consistent with several of the aggregate studies.
Theoretical Foundations and Empirical Specification

System of Simultaneous Equations
Our empirical specification is based on a simple aggregate model that simultaneously determines VMT, vehicles, and fuel efficiency. We assume that consumers in each state choose how much to travel accounting for the size of their vehicle stock and the per-mile fuel cost of driving (among other things). They choose how many vehicles to own accounting for the price of new vehicles, the cost of driving, and other characteristics. Fuel efficiency is determined jointly by consumers and manufacturers accounting for the price of fuel, the regulatory environment, and their expected amount of driving; this process may include manufacturers' adjustments to the relative prices of various models, consumers' adjustments via purchases of various models (including light trucks), consumers' decisions about vehicle scrappage, and driving habits.
These assumptions lead to the following structural model:
9 Examples include Train (1986), Hensher et al. (1992) , Goldberg (1998), and West (2004) . 10 This could occur if people who drive a lot spend more time in stop-and-go traffic, or if they invest more heavily in fuel-consuming amenities like air conditioning or stronger acceleration.
where M is aggregate VMT per adult; V is the size of the vehicle stock per adult; E is fuel efficiency; P V is a price index for new vehicles; P F is the price of fuel; P M ≡P F /E is the fuel cost per mile; X M , X V and X E are exogenous variables (including constants); and R E represents regulatory measures that directly or indirectly influence fleet-average fuel efficiency.
The standard definition of the rebound effect can be derived from a partially reduced form of (1), which is obtained by substituting the second equation into the first and solving for M. Denoting the solution by M , this produces:
We call this equation a "partially reduced form" because V but not E has been eliminated (E being part of the definition of P M ); thus we still must deal with the endogeneity of P M as a statistical issue. The rebound effect is just
, the negative of the elasticity of ) ( ⋅ M with respect to P M . By differentiating (2) and rearranging, we can write this elasticity in terms of the elasticities of structural system (1):
Empirical Implementation
While most studies reviewed in the previous section are implicitly based on (2), we estimate the full structural model based on system (1). We generalize it in two ways to handle dynamics. First, we assume that the error terms in the empirical equations exhibit first-order serial correlation, meaning that unobserved factors influencing usage decisions in a given state will be similar from one year to the next: for example, laws governing driving by minors.
Second, we allow for behavioral inertia by including the one-year lagged value of the dependent variable as a right-hand-side variable. Finally, we specify the equations as linear in parameters and with most variables in logarithms. Thus we estimate the following system: 
with autoregressive errors:
Here, lower-case notation indicates that the variable is in logarithms. Thus vma is the natural logarithm of VMT per adult; vehstock is the log of number of vehicles per adult; and fint is the log of fuel intensity, defined as the reciprocal of fuel efficiency. Variable pf is the log of fuel price; hence log fuel cost per mile, pm, is equal to pf+fint. Variable pv is the log of a price index of new vehicles. The individual variables in each vector k t X may be in either levels or logarithms. Subscript t designates a year, and u and ε are error terms assumed to have zero expected value, with ε assumed to be "white noise". In the third equation, we impose the further
, which implies that fuel price and amount of travel affect the fuel efficiency choice only through their product, which is fuel expenditure; this restriction improves the OLS estimation of the fuel intensity equation and has little effect on other estimates.
In system (4), equation (3) becomes: 
The same considerations apply to other elasticities. It can be shown that the short-and long-run elasticities of vehicle usage with respect to new-car price are:
and the short-and long-run elasticities of fuel intensity with respect to fuel price are approximately:
Our data set is a cross-sectional time series, with each state observed 36 times. We use a fixed effects specification, which we find to be strongly favored over random-effects by a standard Hausman test. The commonly used two-step Cochrane-Orcutt procedure to estimate autocorrelation is known to be statistically biased when the model contains a lagged dependent variable, as ours does (Davidson and MacKinnon, p. 336 ). Therefore we instead transform the model to a nonlinear one with no autocorrelation but with additional lags, and estimate it using nonlinear least squares. 
Variables
This section describes the main variables in (4) and their rationale. We identify each using both the generic notation in (1) and the variable name used in our empirical specification.
11 Derivations of equations (7)- (9) can be found in Small and Van Dender (2005) , section 5.1.
12 The elasticities defined in (9) are those of ) , , , , , (
, the fully reduced-form equation for E obtained by solving (1) for M, V, and E. The formulas given are approximations that ignore the effect of pf on fint via the effect of vehicle stock on vehicle usage combined with the effect of vehicle usage on fuel intensity. This combined effect is especially small because it involves the triple product 1/E: Fuel intensity, F/M, where F is highway use of gasoline (logarithm: fint). Variable pf is its logarithm normalized by subtracting the sample mean.
Independent Variables other than CAFE
2 and interactions between normalized pm and two other normalized variables: log real income (inc) and fraction urbanized (Urban).
Variable to Measure CAFE Regulation (R E )
We define a variable measuring the tightness of CAFE regulation, starting in 1978, based on the difference between the mandated efficiency of new passenger vehicles and the efficiency that would be chosen in the absence of regulation. The variable becomes zero when CAFE is not binding or when it is not in effect. In our system, this variable helps explain the efficiency of new passenger vehicles, while the lagged dependent variable in the fuel-intensity equation captures the inertia due to slow turnover of the vehicle fleet.
The calculation proceeds in four steps, described more fully in Appendix B. First, we estimate a reduced-form equation explaining log fuel intensity from 1966 -1977 equation is interpreted as a partial adjustment model, so that the coefficient of lagged fuel intensity enables us to form a predicted desired fuel intensity for each state in each year, including years after 1977. Third, for a given year, we average desired fuel intensity (in levels, weighted by vehicle-miles traveled) across states to get a national desired average fuel intensity.
Finally, we compare the reciprocal of this desired nationwide fuel intensity to the minimum efficiency mandated under CAFE in a given year (averaged between cars and light trucks using VMT weights, and corrected for the difference between factory tests and real-world driving).
The variable cafe is defined as the difference between the logarithms of mandated and desired fuel efficiency, truncated below at zero.
The comparison is shown in Figure 1 . We see that the desired efficiency of new vehicles was mildly increasing over much of our time period, especially 1975-1979 and 1984-1997 Several variables of our specification, including the first two endogenous variables, make use of data on adult or total state population. Such data are published by the U.S. Census Bureau as midyear population estimates; they use demographic information at the state level to update the most recent census count, taken in years ending with zero. However, these estimates do not always match well with the subsequent census count, and the Census Bureau does not update them to create a consistent series. As a result, the published series contains many instances of implausible jumps in the years of the census count. For our preferred specification, we apply a correction assuming that the census counts are accurate and that the error in estimating population between them grows linearly over that ten-year time interval.
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We believe this approach is better than using the published estimates because it makes use of Census year data that were not available at the time the published estimates were 15 We estimate this 10-year cumulated error by extrapolating from the ninth year's figure: namely, it is (ΔP 10 ) = [P 0 +(10/9)⋅(P 9 -P 0 )] -P 10 , where P y is the published value in the y-th year following the most recent count. We then replace the published value P y by 10 ) 10
constructed (namely, data from the subsequent census count). It should also be better than a simple linear interpolation between Census counts, because it incorporates relevant demographic information that is contained in the published population estimates. 16 The impact of using either of these alternative population estimates is noticeable but not major. The published data yield the highest estimates of the long-run rebound effect (25.8% in the long run), while the linear interpolation produces the lowest estimate (20.6%); these values bracket the result of 22.2% using our preferred data.
3.3.5 Data Summary Table 1 shows summary statistics for the data used in our main specification. We show them for the original rather than the logged version of variables; we also show the logged version after normalization for those variables that enter the specification through interactions. 
Results
Structural Equations
The results of estimating the structural system are presented in Tables 2-4 , excluding the estimated fixed-effect coefficients. Each table shows two different estimation methods: threestage least squares (3SLS) and ordinary least squares (OLS). 17 We also carried out estimations 17 For both 3SLS and 2SLS, the list of instrumental variables includes one lagged value of each exogenous variable and two lagged values of each dependent variable, as necessitated by the existence of both first-order correlation and lagged dependent variables in our specification: see Fair (1984, pp. 212-213) or Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, section 10.10 ). In addition, the inclusion in our specification of pm^2 ≡ (pf+fint) 2 requires including as instruments those combinations of variables that appear when fint is replaced by its regression equation and (pf+fint) 2 is expanded. As noted by Wooldridge (2002, section 9.5), it is not usually practical to include every such combination separately; he suggests as a compromise using combinations of the composite variable fint_inst, defined as the predicted value of fint based on the coefficients of an OLS estimate of the fint equation. We adopt this suggestion by including pf 2 , pf*fint_inst, and (fint_inst) 2 among the instruments. This procedure ignores the endogeneity of vma by two-stage least squares (2SLS) and generalized method of moments (GMM), as discussed in Section 4.4.
The VMT equation (Table 2) The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable implies considerable inertia in behavior, with people adjusting their travel in a given year by just 21 percent of the ultimate shift if a given change is maintained permanently. The equation exhibits only mild autocorrelation, giving us some confidence that our specification accounts for most influences that move sluggishly over time.
OLS overestimates the rebound effect, possibly because it attributes the relationship between VMT and cost per mile as the latter causing the former, whereas the full system shows that some of it is due to reverse causality. In this particular model, OLS overestimates the absolute value of the structural coefficient of cost per mile by 88%.
among the variables explaining fint in this first-stage OLS, but we think any resulting error is small because vma is just one of seven statistically significant variables explaining fint. Variables inc , Urban , and the constituent variables in pm are normalized by subtracting their mean value in the sample, both in the variable itself and in any interactions it takes. As a result, the coefficient of any variable in its uninteracted form gives the effect of that variable on vma at the mean values of the other variables.
In the vehicle stock equation (Table 3) , the cost of driving a mile has no significant effect. New-car price and income do have significant effects, as do road provision (adults/roadmile), the proportion of adults having drivers' licenses (licences/adult), and credit conditions (interest). As expected, there is strong inertia in expanding or contracting the vehicle stock, as indicated by the coefficient 0.845 on the lagged dependent variable. This means that any shortrun effect on vehicle ownership, for example from an increase in income, will be magnified by a factor of 1/(1-0.845) = 6.45 in the long run. This presumably reflects the transaction costs of buying and selling vehicles as well as the time needed to adjust planned travel behavior. The results for fuel intensity ( Table 5 shows the cost-per-mile elasticity of driving (the negative of the rebound effect) and some other elasticities implied by the structural models. The interactions through the simultaneous equations modify only slightly the numbers that can be read directly from the coefficients. In particular, the average cost-per-mile elasticity in the sample is -0.0452, indistinguishable (within the precision shown) from the coefficient of pm in Table 2 . Thus the average rebound effect in this sample is estimated to be approximately 4.5% in the short run, and 22.2% in the long run. Use of OLS overestimates the short-and long-run rebound effects by 88% and 53%, respectively. The short-run OLS estimate (8.5%) is well within the consensus of the literature, whereas our 3SLS estimate is somewhat below the consensus. This comparison might suggest that many estimates in the literature are overstated because of endogeneity bias. But such a conclusion would be speculative given the poor performance of the OLS specification on other grounds. We found the OLS results sensitive to slight changes in specification -sometimes indicating implausibly high autocorrelation and implausibly small coefficients on lagged dependent variables -whereas 2SLS and 3SLS results are quite robust. Thus differences among OLS results in the literature, and differences between those results and ours, may be caused as much by differences in specification as by endogeneity bias.
Rebound Effects and Other Elasticities
The model for vehicle usage discerns additional influences on the rebound effect. The coefficient on pm*inc in Table 2 shows that a 0.1 increase in inc (i.e. a 10.5 percent increase in real income) reduces the magnitude of the short-run rebound effect by about 0.58 percentage
points. This appears to confirm the theoretical expectation that higher incomes make people less sensitive to fuel costs. Urbanization has a smaller effect: a 10 percentage-point increase in urbanization reduces the rebound effect by about 0.25 percentage points. Finally, fuel cost itself raises the rebound effect as expected (coefficient of pm^2 in Table 2 ), but only modestly and without statistical significance. To get an idea of the implications of such variations, we compute the short-and long-run rebound effects for values of income, urbanization, and fuel costs of driving equal to those of the average state over the most recent five-year period covered in our data set, namely 1997-2001. Using the 3SLS results, we see that the short-run rebound effect is reduced to 2.2% and the long-run effect to 10.7% (second row in Table 5 ). These reductions are mainly the result of income growth and declining fuel prices, the latter accounting for about twofifths of this decline.
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The second panel of Table 5 shows that higher new car prices reduce travel, but only by a small amount, with a long-run elasticity of -0.09. The third and fourth panels provide information about how fuel prices affect fuel intensity and overall fuel consumption. The fuelprice elasticity of fuel intensity, given by equation (9), is estimated with good precision thanks to the small standard error on the coefficient of vma+pf in Table 4 . Adding to it the elasticity of vehicle-miles traveled gives the total price-elasticity of fuel consumption, shown in the last panel of the table. The long-run estimate is -0.43, close to the middle of recent studies. In fact, our estimates both of this elasticity and of the proportion of it due to changes in vehicle travel (0.2221/0.4268 = 52%) are in line with the literature as reviewed by Parry and Small (2005) .
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Note, however, that the proportion caused by changes in vehicle travel decreases to 32% in the last five years of our sample.
Thus, our results suggest that the response to fuel prices has become increasingly dominated by changes in fuel efficiency rather than changes in travel. Whether this remains the case after 2001 depends on how incomes and fuel costs of driving evolve. For example, our point estimates imply that the decline in rebound effect arising from growth in real income of one percent would be offset by an increase in real fuel cost per mile of about 2.8 percent. This in turn could be brought about by a 3.5 percent increase in real fuel price and the accompanying 0.7 percent fall in fuel intensity. 23 To put it another way, a doubling of real fuel price would be offset by a 22 percent increase in real income in their influence on the rebound effect. 
Estimates on separate time periods
As noted, we find the rebound effect to be much smaller when computed for values of per capita income characterizing recent years than when computed for average values over the 36-year estimation period. Would we see this same decline if we just estimated a model with a constant rebound effect on different time periods? We answered this question using three twelveyear time periods. The resulting estimates are considerably less precise and less robust, especially for the fuel intensity equation: its estimated autocorrelation coefficient is uncomfortably large in magnitude during the second and third time periods (+0.47 and -0.25), and the estimates of the effect of cafe (for the two periods where it was in effect) show implausible variations. Furthermore, the coefficient of lagged vma in the usage equation is considerably smaller (0.55 to 0.58) when estimated on these subsamples than when estimated on the full sample. Both problems may reflect the inability with such short time periods to clearly 23 These statements are approximate because they equate changes in logs to percentage changes and also because they use ignore the small terms in α mv in (6) and (7); they are also qualified by the fact that the effect of fuel prices is not statistically significant. The first statement is based on coefficients β pm^2 of pm^2 and β pm*inc of pm⋅inc in Table   2 , remembering that ∂ε M,PM /∂pm ≡ ∂ 2 vma/∂pm 2 = 2β pm^2 and ∂ε M,PM /∂inc ≡ ∂ 2 vma/∂pm∂inc = β pm*inc . The second statement is based on the long-run elasticity of fuel intensity with respect to fuel price in Table 5 , which is constant over time in our specification except for the small terms in α fm in (9); it implies that a fuel-price increase of 3.5 percent causes a change in fuel intensity of -0.20x3.5=0.7 percent. identify the nature of variation over time, especially given that two of the eleven years' data are lost because of using variables with two lags as instruments.
Nevertheless, the summary results in Table 6 clearly show the hypothesized decline in the rebound effect as we move from the first two periods to the last period. The table shows our 3SLS estimates of the short-and long-run rebound effect in each time period, and compares them with those predicted by our base model at the average values of variables for that period. Except for the first period, the long-run estimates agree closely with these full-model predictions. Shortrun estimates are mostly larger than the prediction. The first column of the table also shows that the average rebound effect estimated over the entire period does not depend strongly on whether the model includes interaction terms. The same is true if the rebound effect is allowed to vary with a simple time trend but not income or urbanization, although in that model the interaction term is not significant (results not shown). 1966-2001 1966-1977 1978-1989 1990-2001 Thus this exercise lends support to our interpretation that the rebound effect has indeed declined between the time periods 1966-1989 and 1990-2001 . Although we cannot say definitively that the reason is higher incomes, that explanation seems the most likely given its theoretically justification and good data fit.
Full Sample
Other Specifications and Estimation Methods
As we have seen, fuel prices are potentially important for the rebound effect; but their influence depends on a coefficient (that of pm^2) whose estimate is statistically imprecise. We therefore explore here the behavior of the model if that term is omitted. We also show some 2SLS results for both the full model and this reduced model, in order to examine more carefully whether specification error in the model could be adversely affecting the 3SLS estimates.
Comparisons are shown in Table 7 , whose top panel repeats 3SLS results already presented in Tables 2 and 5 . Several observations are prompted by comparing the four models defined by these two specifications and two estimation methods. First, all four models predict about the same average rebound effect over the sample: 4.5-5.0 percent in the short run, 22-23 percent in the long run.
Second, the simplified specification exhibits less difference between 3SLS and 2SLS than the full specification. In particular, both 3SLS and 2SLS predict that the rebound effect is only about half as large in the latest five years as it is over the entire sample. Third, with 3SLS, the simplified specification is somewhat more conservative than the full specification in predicting how much the rebound effect has declined during the period; but it is more radical in the predicted effect of income because this simplified specification does not use fuel prices to help explain the decline.
Thus, the simplified specification behaves quite reliably and the full specification is similar to it except that it allows for an influence of fuel cost on the rebound effect. This leads us to prefer the full specification as the better source of point estimates and policy-relevant predictions, even though those predictions -if they involve changes in fuel cost per mile -are based on a statistically insignificant coefficient. Furthermore, the stability of the simplified specification lends support to the view that the model is well specified, making 3SLS a suitable estimator. Indeed, the table suggests that 2SLS has difficulty disentangling the effects of pm and pm^2 in the full specification -it yields a positive coefficient for pm^2, opposite to the theoretical prediction. Statistically, this contrast is within sampling error but it does make 2SLS less satisfactory as a source of point estimates for policy analysis.
The third pair of columns in Table 7 shows the results of using a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator that allows the residuals to be correlated arbitrarily over time and for their variances to vary over time. Similarly, we estimated a GMM model (not shown) allowing for arbitrary contemporaneous correlation and heteroskedasticity across states. 25 We were prompted to try these estimators because of concerns that because of heteroskedasticity or inadequate controls for time-varying unobserved effects, 3SLS might understate the standard errors (Bertrand et al., 2004) . 26 But in fact we see that neither the point estimates or the standard errors are much different with GMM, except for a change in the coefficient of pm^2 that is within statistical precision. We conclude that our 3SLS results are not adversely affected by the properties of the pooled sample.
To summarize, all models find that the rebound effect declined over the period. We prefer the full specification because it allows for a plausible set of reasons for this decline, and we prefer the 3SLS estimator because it appears more successful in allocating this decline quantitatively among those reasons. In terms of policy, the full specification with 3SLS also happens to be the most conservative approach in terms of our main result, which is that the rebound effect declines with income. Assuming real income continues to grow, any of our models will project a further decline from this source in the future; but the magnitude of that predicted decline will be smaller using our preferred results than using any other models shown in Table 8 because our preferred results contain the smallest estimate of the coefficient of pm*inc.
Caveats
Despite the generally good performance of our equation system, we call attention to three limitations. First, there are well-known problems with the VMT data collected by the US Federal Highway Administration. These data are reported by states, which lack a uniform methodology for estimating them -for example, some rely on sporadic vehicle counts, while others multiply fuel consumption (measured from tax records) by an independent estimate of fleet fuel efficiency.
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However, we have no reason to think that these problems bias our results. The posited sources of measurement error are mostly unrelated to our independent variables; and even if they were, our use of fixed effects eliminates the spurious effect of any cross-state relationship that is 26 In principle one could handle this concern by computing robust standard errors from the 3SLS results, but doing so is impractical due to the complexity of our model system; but such standard erros are calculated automatically by the GMM procedure.
27 VMT estimates in other data sets have problems as well. For example, the 1990 Nationwide Personal Transportation Survey (NPTS) changed its sampling method in a manner that exaggerated the measured 1983-1990 growth in VMT. Lave (1996) Second, our estimates, like those of most previous studies, rely on the theoretical restriction that people react to changes in cost per mile in the same way whether those changes arise from variations in fuel prices or in fuel efficiency. This restriction is critical to most studies because most data sets contain more variation in fuel prices than in fuel efficiency.
Unfortunately, we are unable to confirm the restriction with our data and model.
Using the simplified specification of Table 7 several instances large and opposite in sign, and the predicted desired fuel intensity show implausible oscillations over time. Therefore, we believe our base specification is the most suitable one given the short time period over which we can observe pre-CAFE behavior.
Conclusion
Our study supports many earlier findings that the long-run rebound effect, i. This result is relevant to policy. For example, the recent debate over whether to strengthen fuel-efficiency standards has emphasized the potential adverse effects on traffic congestion (e.g. Portney et al., 2003) . If the rebound effect has become smaller over time, these adverse effects will be smaller than has been thought. More generally, quantity standards are relatively more attractive compared to fuel taxes if the secondary effects of the standards on other consumer decisions are small. Put differently, if most of the elasticity of fuel consumption with respect to price reflects changes in the fuel efficiency of vehicles, as our results imply, then it is easier to design standards whose effects on fuel consumption and driving are similar to those of taxes. Their effects on fuel tax revenues, of course, are still different. In urbanized areas, traffic congestion is an endogenous part of the system explaining reactions to changes in fuel efficiency. Presumably, any increased congestion would curtail the increased travel predicted by our model. To say how much, we would need a model of congestion formation along with a model explaining how it affects the demand for travel. Our model makes a start on this by including as variables urbanization and population relative to road supply, but a more exact link to congestion would be a desirable addition. where i designates a state, superscript R indicates the reduced form, and X fR denotes the set of all exogenous variables used, including prices, as described above. The results of this estimation are shown in Table B1 . The statistically significant coefficients are those of (fint) t-1 , D7479, and pv. This value is computed for each state and each year t.
3. From the estimated values of ( ) is less than the minimum mandated efficiency, t E . The latter is computed as a weighted average of the CAFE standards for light trucks and cars, the weights being current nationwide light truck and car VMT, reduced by 16%, which is an estimate of the difference between fuel efficiency achieved in real driving and that achieved on the tests used to enforce the CAFE standard (Harrington, 2003) . A measure of the strength of CAFE regulation is then 
